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Belarusian Professional Protesters 
in the Structure of Democracy Promotion
Enacting Politics, Reinforcing Divisions
Alena Minchenia
  ABSTRACT: Th is article analyzes divisions within Belarusian protest communities by 
focusing on a particular group: the professional protesters. In Belarus, this group occu-
pies a crucial position in between the international structures of democracy promo-
tion and the internal attempts of political mobilization against the politics of President 
Aliaksandr Lukashenka. Performativity as an analytical perspective is employed to 
defi ne positionality of professional protesters in relation to other political subjects and 
within the system of democracy promotion. Th e article shows implications of neolib-
eral rationality for social and political changes for protest communities in Belarus. It 
argues that the fi nancial assistance obtained by protest professionals, as well as non-
democratic leader ship style of the oppositional leaders, fi lls the Belarusian protest fi eld 
with suspicions and accusations, add to a hierarchical and exclusionary way of partici-
pation in decision-making, and alienate activists from protest politics.
  KEYWORDS: Belarus, democracy promotion, performativity, political protests, protesters, 
protest community, subjectivity
For more than 25 years, Belarusian political activists have been struggling to challenge the 
power of the current president, Aliaksandr Lukashenka. Studies of the dynamics of political 
contestation in Belarus have a certain pattern: they tend to analyze the Belarusian opposition in 
connection to elections (Ash 2015; Bedford 2017; Nikolayenko 2015, 2017; Silitski 2012, 2015) 
and consequently deal with the electoral protests (e.g., Korosteleva 2009; Navumau 2016). As 
elections are indeed the most active period of the Belarusian oppositional politics, this approach 
captures the general tendencies and gives the overall understanding of the Belarusian opposi-
tion. At the same time, it lacks certain sensitivity toward processes beyond and in between the 
elections and homogenizes the Belarusian opposition. Th is article strives to deepen the exist-
ing understanding of Belarusian protests and their actors by focusing on a particular position 
within the protest communities: professional protesters. My analysis aims to demonstrate how 
professionalization of protests creates divisions and dispossessions within the Belarusian protest 
communities. For this, I use the ethnographic data gathered between 2015 and 2017 in Minsk.
I started my fi eldwork in August 2015, just a week aft er the last political prisoner at that 
time, and a presidential candidate in 2010, Mikalai Statkevich, was released from prison.1 Upon 
his release, Statkevich organized a series of public protests in Minsk that aimed, as he oft en 
repeated, “to enlarge the space of freedom” (fi eld notes, fall 2015). Regular protest actions were 
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in clear contrast with the period aft er 2010 when activities of political activists and groups were 
mostly suppressed.2 However, as it became gradually apparent, the series of actions in 2015 did 
not provoke mass mobilization but were instead supported by the same small groups of activists.
Th is reality infl uenced the atmosphere of the protests and was ambivalently interpreted 
among activists. On the one hand, in conversations with me, participants admitted feelings of 
closeness and fun to be with “their people.” On the other hand, many of them were concerned 
about the marginal status of the political opposition in Belarus. Th e latter became even more 
emphasized in my interviews with former activists and indeed revealed an even more notable 
process formative of the Belarusian protest communities: the shrinking of activists’ circles and 
the professionalization or NGO-ization of the Belarusian political opposition. In the refl ections 
of the former activist Yana, the disengagement is perceived as a natural process of growing out 
of the protest activities: “I witnessed the lives of many people. My generation, those once young 
activists, grew up and left , fi rst of all, as it is an issue of aging, people started families, some 
started business. Th us, only those who do [political activism] as a main occupation stayed” 
(interview, 9 October 2015).
At the same time, other activists expressed a certain disappointment in relation to their 
former communities, quoting diffi  culties in having their opinion heard and barriers in deci-
sion-making processes. Furthermore, the activists discussed how the political repressions and 
perceived inability of the movement to bring political changes had an eff ect of exhausting the 
streams of new political activists and of disengagement of former members from oppositional 
organizations. Th ese processes have not only reduced the activists’ numbers but furthermore 
transformed the structure of political opposition in Belarus that now predominately comprises 
of people for whom political struggles are their main job. All this, in turn, creates a condition 
of political dispossession (Kocze 2015)—the situation where political power is transferred from 
volunteers and grassroots activists to a narrow circle of protest professionals.
It is against this background that the fi nancial support of international funds and foreign 
governments needs to be considered. As I strive to show in this article, the particular way 
democracy was promoted in the region facilitated a project approach (Sampson 2004) to 
political activism. Th is, in turn, had particular implications for the protest communities: high 
competition for limited resources and signifi cant dependence on the external defi nition of the 
movement’s agenda. Strategies of actions associated with this approach challenged the solidar-
ity and dispossessed the members of the political power inside the protest communities. My 
data consists of the fi eld diaries describing the participant observation of diff erent oppositional 
events (mostly, street protest actions but also public discussions and gathering) and 57 in-depth 
interviews with diff erent oppositional actors focusing on their political involvement. All my 
informants are anonymized with pseudonyms while quoting them in the text.
Belarusian protest communities3 can be thought as a constellation of diff erent subject’s posi-
tions that together constitutes Belarusian protests. Based on this defi nition, I analyze Belarusian 
protest communities not as a set of political parties and organizations but as complex relations 
between diff erent protest subjectivities. I scrutinize these relations as they are perceived by the 
members of Belarusian protest communities themselves. I diff erentiate the protest subjectivities 
based on two factors that have also emerged from the data. Th e fi rst factor relates to the depth 
of involvement in social and political changes and encompasses a continuum from protests’ 
supporters to activists. Th e second factor relates to participation in protests as a professional 
activity and includes such actors as journalists, civil right defenders, experts, and professional 
protesters.
In this article, I focus on the fi gure of the professional protester that I have defi ned empiri-
cally as a politically involved person known to the public (indicated, for example, by their recog-
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nition by journalists, observers, and protest communities and their preventive detention by the 
police), having a distinct symbolic capital within Belarusian protest communities and an access 
to the protest economy. I use the concept “protest economy” to defi ne a part of aid economy that 
is allocated for a specifi c purpose of democracy promotion. As the article will demonstrate, pro-
fessional protesters embody the processes formative for Belarusian protest communities. Th e 
positionality of a professional protester in the fi eld of Belarusian political opposition, as well as 
in the way they relate to the international structure of democracy promotion (Carothers 2009; 
Pikulik and Bedford 2018), allows me to analyze the implications of neoliberal rationality on the 
eff orts of Belarusian protest communities to achieve social and political changes.
Performativity and the Grand Narrative of Resistance
In her book Notes toward a Performative Th eory of Assembly, Judith Butler defi nes protests as 
materialization of “the people.” In protests, “the people” no longer function as an empty signifi er 
of a source of political power. She suggests “a plural and performative right to appear . . . asserts 
and instates the body in the midst of the political fi eld” (2015: 11). Furthermore, Butlerian 
theory of performativity points to ambivalent dynamics of street politics. On the one hand, 
social gatherings need, perform, and establish “we” as a certain ontological entity. On the other 
hand, the construction of “we” puts into play the dynamic of inclusion and exclusion. Looking 
at protests as the enactment of the right to appear and the embodiment of “the people” should 
not foreclose refl ections on social diff erentiation and inequality. Th is part of the Butlerian argu-
ment becomes an inspiration for my article that attempts to refl ect on who can in fact appear in 
Belarusian protests. Butler calls for recognition of privileges and complexities of social vulner-
abilities, when “some people fail to show up or are constrained from doing so; many live on the 
margins of the metropole, some are congregated on the border in refugee camps . . . , and yet 
others are in prison or detained” (166). I engage with these inclusions and exclusions while ana-
lyzing how “we” of the Belarusian political opposition and the fi gure of a professional protester 
in particular are constructed.
Furthermore, my analysis of professionalization of Belarusian protesters draws its insights 
from the scholarship on neoliberal transformation of social movements. As research shows, 
turned into attractive commodities, alternative ideas and practices become devoid of their 
political and transformative potential and in fact help maintaining the status quo (Brown 2015; 
McRobbie 2008; Rothe and Collins 2017). Th is tendency in relation to protest communities and 
social movement is conceptualized in terms of “corporatization of activism” (Dauvergne and 
LeBaron 2014) and “NGO-ization of resistance” (Korolczuk 2016; Roy 2016; Sampson 2004). 
Scholars criticize co-optation of activism by a business approach that in turn hinders activists’ 
abilities to demand structural changes. As Arundhati Roy (2016: 335) puts it, “Th e NGO-ization 
of politics threatens to turn resistance into a well-mannered, reasonable, salaried, 9-to-5 job . . . 
Real resistance has real consequences. And no salary.” At the same time, implications of neolib-
eral rationality for the work on social and political changes depend directly on the geopolitical 
context. Indeed, most of the critique is voiced from advanced democracies (e.g., Dauvergne and 
LeBaron 2014; Rothe and Collins 2017; Roy 2016). Th e analysis of Belarusian protest commu-
nities should also take into account multiple dependencies that are formed as a result of power 
asymmetries in the global structure of democracy promotion.
Sean Chabot and Stellan Vinthagen point out the dominance of one, “Western,” model of 
resistance functioning as a blueprint in the research and practice of social movements irre-
spective of their context, and defi ne this as “the grand narrative of resistance” (2015: 517). Th e 
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authors argue that studies of non-Western resistance oft en reproduces dominant power struc-
ture by suggesting “Western brands of liberal democracy” as a universal path for protesters to 
follow and the main approach to defi ne what resistance is. Th ey caution against such think-
ing that takes for granted capitalist liberal democracy as an unquestionable value and political 
model to fi ght for: “We claim that the current colonial logic of domination strongly infl uences 
nonviolent action practitioners and researchers across the globe, seducing many to believe that 
there is no alternative to the colonizing model of capitalist liberal democracy” (518). In this 
article, I draw on the ideas of Chabot and Vinthagen to refl ect on visions and practices enacted 
by Belarusian professional protesters. I strive to shed light on how struggles for democracy in 
Belarus are shaped by “the grand narrative of resistance” that is mediated through the interna-
tional economy of democracy promotion. I am interested in the eff ects that this process aiming 
“to gain access to the privileged Western side of the coloniality line” (530) has for local protest 
communities.
Professional Protesters: Defi ning Features
Th e embodied “we” of protesters is never homogenous, and neither are the professionals involved 
in protests. As my data suggests, the need for a certain professionally performed work in the 
fi eld of Belarusian protests became apparent with strengthening of state repressions against pro-
testers in the 1990s.4 Every entry in my fi eld diaries that is devoted to mass actions contains 
descriptions of diff erent professionals busy at the event. Th ese could be diff erentiated into pro-
test professionals—observers (human rights defenders), independent journalists, experts—on 
the one hand, and professional protesters (opposition politicians) on the other.
Th e last group is the most ambiguous, as it is formed at the intersection of positionality of 
regular protesters and of professionals. Furthermore, the position of professional protesters 
in Belarus refl ects two processes: shrinking of the political sphere under Lukashenka’s presi-
dency,5 and professionalization of activism. Contrary to the fi rst process, which is limited to 
local and to a certain extent regional frames, professionalization of activism is a global phe-
nomenon. Researchers argue (Alonso and Maciek 2010; Kleidman 1994; Stoker 2006) that new 
resources and opportunities associated with international fl ows of capital, expertise, and tech-
nology engender formalization and institutionalization of informal grassroots initiatives. Th is 
in turn aff ects the preferred form and accountability of activism: actions shift  from protests 
to more conventional forms such as cooperation and negotiations with the state, supported 
by donors and increasingly detached from the communities (Alonso and Maciek 2010; Roy 
2016).
Limited political opportunities and professionalization of activism defi ne specifi c features 
of those who have become drawn into the position of protest professionals in Belarus. On the 
one hand, the Belarusian politicians deprived of traditional political means (e.g., participation 
in the elected state bodies, negotiations with the government, etc.) to oppose the state policy 
rely on protest actions. On the other hand, like their international colleagues, activists of Bela-
rusian political organizations have faced eff ects of professionalization of activism that diff er-
entiate their access to resources of the protest economy. Moreover, in the Belarusian case, state 
repressions against opposition activists and politicians raise their symbolic capital in the eyes 
of the international community, donors, and local activists but simultaneously also marginalize 
the most active part of the opposition within the society. In such a way, the gap between the 
professional activists and the broader community that already exists because of the process of 
professionalization (Alonso and Maciek 2010; Stoker 2006) becomes even more pronounced.
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Th e fi rst generation of protest professionals came out of the national movement of the late 
1980s. At that time, several civil and political organizations (such as the Belarusian Popu-
lar Front, the Union of Belarusian Students, the cultural organizations Talaka and the Fran-
cysk Skaryna Belarusian Language Society), mobilized by anti-communist ideas and the (re)
discovery of “the truth” about national history and culture appeared.6 Many representatives 
of the younger generation of protest professionals also have activist backgrounds and were 
involved in the oppositional youth organizations such as Zubr and Malady Front in the late 
1990s and early 2000s. My data suggests that moving to the position of a journalist or a civil 
right defender is regarded as one of the demobilizing strategies of activists, while moving to the 
position of a politician (professional protester) is associated with deepening one’s involvement 
in the political contestation. In general, the boundaries between diff erent subject positions 
within the protest communities are blurred and permeable. In this context, the positionality 
of professional protesters is an ethnographically informed defi nition reconstructing its most 
salient traits.
Th e defi ning feature of professional protesters is their direct participation in the protest econ-
omy, which ranges from receiving fi nancial support for their work to having access to fi nancial 
assistance in some special cases, such as paying fi nes they received for participating in the pro-
tests.7 Th e police attention concentrated mostly on the well-known activists, who, as a result, 
were fi ned for their every appearance at a protest action, while the rest of the protesters (includ-
ing me) faced no consequences for their participation.8 In this situation, access to fi nancial help 
for paying the fi nes, especially as many of these activists had no other jobs, together with the 
particular status of these protesters confi rmed by the police and court actions, singled the pro-
fessional protesters out from others.
It should be noted that fi nancial issues were one of the most controversial themes in the fi eld. 
On the one hand, references to “Western money” were oft en used by the authorities to under-
mine the sincerity of protesters’ intentions and fed feelings of distrust in politics in a broader 
public. Indeed, fi nancial issues actually did play a role in disillusionment and disappointment in 
oppositional structures that several activists recalled in the interviews with me, whether or not 
stoked by the authorities. On the other hand, open discussions on this topic were also diffi  cult 
to some extent for security reasons, as well as because of discomfort associated with personal 
fi nancial issues more generally.
Compared to professional protesters, the protest professionals such as independent journal-
ists, observers, and experts emphasize as tokens of their professionalism their guiding principle 
of objectivity, positing noninvolvement and neutrality toward any side of contention, and dis-
interest in gaining power. Although there are a number of issues that makes objectivity rather 
illusory, it is important to note here how this principle is enacted in the fi eld. It is manifested 
through spatial separation from protesters, special clothing (e.g., bright blue vests marked with 
#Control.by) and other attributes and signs (e.g., visible badges of journalists, microphones and 
cameras marked with names of media), as well as particular practices (e.g., the task of counting 
protesters, reporting of protesters’ actions), as opposed to other activities (e.g., joining in shout-
ing slogans, carrying fl ags and banners).
Professional protesters, on the other hand, engage directly in the actions and are motivated 
to change the power. Looking from the perspective of performativity, the fi gure of the protester, 
in general, is the eff ect of repetitive performances of dissent and of accompanying recognition 
of these performances as such. Yet others, with their various relations to protesting subjects, 
starting from support and ending with acts of repression, confi rm these expressions of dissent 
and of protest subjectivities as such. At the same time, recognition of professional protesters has 
its specifi city. Th eir mere appearance at a protest site puts into motion practices, expressions 
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reproducing their status inside the community. Th e following extract from my fi eld diary illus-
trates this form of recognition:
Th e initiator of the protest appears in the square. He immediately becomes the center of 
common attention. Participants and journalists start gathering around him trying to come 
closer, to shake his hand, to express their support and happiness seeing him being free, to ask 
for a comment and to report his words. I notice a woman behind me who attempts to move 
forward in a quite dense crowd and says, “Let me see this courageous man.”9 (Field notes, 23 
September 2015)
Th is observation shows not only how positioning a person within a protest happens through 
interactions among diff erent actors but also that recognition translates into symbolic power 
inside the assembling group. As my informants suggest in the interviews, the infl uence of pro-
fessional protesters is measured by the quantity of activists loyal to them. In street actions, 
professional protesters perform their claim for status as they choose elevated places (stairs or 
monuments’ pedestals) to stand; they are those who address protesters, lead a column in the 
case of marches, and stay for some time aft er a protest for concluding interviews.
Th ese empirical features allow representing the position of a professional protester as a 
combination of symbolic and economic power within protest communities. In case their role 
is seen as more signifi cant, these people are also called “a leader of the opposition,” “a national 
leader,” and “an oppositional politician.” In this article, I use these notions together with “pro-
fessional protester.” At the same time, the notion of politician might be somewhat mislead-
ing if one thinks of strictly political ways of doing politics. Th e Belarusian opposition has no 
representation in the governmental bodies and parliament, and does not participate in state 
decisions. Th e only form of political activities open for the Belarusian opposition is elections, 
which off er no real chance to be elected. Th erefore, some of my informants are critical of their 
colleagues who stand as candidates, legitimizing problematic elections this way. Many never-
theless invest their eff orts in electoral campaigns that, because of the need to create the illusion 
of free elections, are to a certain degree tolerated by the authorities and therefore are the only 
possibility to engage with a broader public. Independently of the decision to stand for elections 
or not, all Belarusian oppositional politicians see international political bodies as mediators 
between themselves and the Belarusian state and attempt to infl uence the Belarusian govern-
ment through their international partners. In what follows, I predominantly consider profes-
sional protesters as actors in protests and look at how oppositional politicians are engaged in 
street politics.
Th e Issue of Relationality: Professional Protesters 
within Belarusian Protest Communities
Oppositional politicians embody an alternative political perspective for Belarusian protest com-
munities. Over the years of oppositional street politics, a calendar of traditional oppositional 
protests has been formed. It includes the procession to Kurapaty, a site of the Stalinist repres-
sion and a mass grave of its victims on the day of Dzyady (commemoration of ancestors on 1 
November); the celebration of Dzen’ Voli (Freedom Day), commemorating the declaration of 
independence by the Belarusian People’s Republic (BPR) on 25 March 1918;10 and the Cher-
nobyl March (commemoration of the Chernobyl disaster on 26 April). For these actions, profes-
sional protesters decide on details such as the schedule, location, and major slogans, and apply 
to authorities for permission.
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In the observed period, most of the protests in Minsk were initiated by professional protest-
ers and exceeded the traditional yearly oppositional agenda. In such cases, protest organizers 
either adhered to other dates important for the Belarusian history (such as the date of disap-
pearance of oppositional politicians in the late 1990, the date of acceptance of the Declaration 
of Independence) or used current events to set protest agenda and channel popular concerns 
(e.g., of the potential for another Russian military base in Belarus, or the introduction of a tax 
to “social parasites”).
While such activities appear unproblematic on the surface, immersion into diff erent oppo-
sitional communities has indicated complicated relationships between the diff erent parts of the 
protest communities, in particular, the leaders and the activists. As relationality is formative for 
positionality of any protest subjectivities, I will focus on how professional protesters relate to 
other subjects in protest communities. Relations to activists, who do mundane tasks for protest 
professionals (spread leafl ets and other mobilizing information, collect signatures in case of 
petitions or for registration of a person for election, etc.), support and literally embody their 
ideas (e.g. appear in actions, chant slogans suggested by speakers, carry oppositional and orga-
nizational symbols), are especially instructive for a position of an opposition leader.
Since the oppositional communities in Belarus are quite small and built on informal net-
works, many activists’ stories about politicians are based on personal interactions and direct 
experiences. In the interviews, my informants usually characterize every leader individually. 
For the purpose of this article, however, I concentrate not on particular personalities but on 
positioning the fi gure of a professional protester in the protest community. Accumulating in the 
protesting circles since the 1990s, stories about opposition leaders are an assemblage of facts, 
emotions, and judgments.
Th ese stories demonstrate how the shared mood of activists’ refl ections about politicians is 
formed around broken promises and unfulfi lled expectations. In these narratives, publicity and 
politicians’ ambition to lead are juxtaposed with the possible consequences of political involve-
ment and the required emotional and practical labor of the activists. Moreover, by using “us 
versus them” construction, the activists distance themselves from the professional protesters. 
Th ey position themselves as working for leaders, which alienates activists from protests’ goals 
and reduces the meaning of their own eff orts. For example, “None of the opposition leaders 
can propose to activists anything but going to prison for their leader” (interview with Nasta, a 
journalist, 20 October 2015); “Us, young and active, work ourselves to the bone and those peo-
ple—the leaders—reap the rewards” (interview with Artiom, an activist, 20 April 2016).
Professional protesters not only benefi t from activists’ work but, furthermore, are seen to 
evade their part of duties. Politicians who may seemingly be on the same side as the rest of the 
protesters are instead represented as untrustworthy and unable in critical moments to confi rm 
and enact their ambition to leadership. Discussions about political leaders (mostly about the 
oppositional presidential candidates of diff erent years) bring to the forefront numerous exam-
ples where they abandoned their once desired position of leadership soon aft er the elections, 
not prepared to actually lead and sustain electoral protests, and even becoming involved in 
fraud:
Hancharyk [an oppositional presidential candidate in 2001 from the united opposition] 
said—not even the next day [but] the day of the election—“Th anks everyone, that is it, 
goodbye.” . . . Th e campaign was cool and fun, but it ended with a complete failure because 
the candidate himself said “goodbye.” . . . In 2006, Milinkevich [an oppositional presidential 
candidate] said thank you and goodbye . . . He had had enormous support, but many peo-
ple who had been organizing the protest action on the election day became disappointed. 
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Many of them at that time were already in prison with me. Th ey had given their best and 
ended up in prison and Milinkevich did not put their eff orts to good use. On the election 
day, he ended the protest and let people go home.11 (Interview with Ian, a former activist, 
15 October 2015)
In 2010, of the nine oppositional candidates, only two12 collected 100,000 signatures [neces-
sary for registration as presidential candidates]; the others are simply liars. And those people 
called for a protest. We came to the square and the politicians were at a loss. Th ose guys didn’t 
have any plan at all. When aft er a year since the event, some people were still in prisons, there 
was a discussion. And the politicians were asked directly: Did you have a plan in 2010? Th ey 
said that we hadn’t found a time to meet. (Interview with Miron, a former activist, 16 October 
2015)
Th ese oppositional leaders don’t even bother to make leafl ets; they call to journalists, “Come, 
I will be there,” and that’s it . . . It was evident for me that they had not been prepared [in the 
2010 protest aft er the presidential election]—they didn’t know what to do with the people, 
where to take them, and what to call for . . . Th ere was no coordination between diff erent 
leaders. And this is disappointing. Th is is dishonest. (Interview with Nasta, a journalist, 20 
October 2015)
Abandoning the political ambitions by emigrating or changing career is another example 
evoked by activists talking about the oppositional leaders as rather absent political fi gures: 
“For many activists, Sannikau ruined himself as a leader when he had said that he would never 
leave the country, but a week aft er he left ” (interview with Ales, 14 October 2015); “If one looks 
at the presidential campaigns, there were ten opposition candidates in 2010. Who has stayed 
in politics? No one, except Niakliaeu, Sannikau left  the country”13 (interview with Anatol, 16 
October 15). Regarding formal leadership in the oppositional structures, activists suggested 
politicians occupy their positions unfairly and for a length of time that should be considered 
undemocratic:
What can one do aft er being a leader of a party? Th ere is nowhere to go, so one considers 
their task to be staying as the party leader until old age. As a result, we do not have rotation. 
Let’s take one example, Liabedzka, who has led the party almost as long as Lukashenka has 
been in power. During the party’s elections, he simply faces a puppet opponent and becomes 
reelected. (Interview with Polina, 3 November 2015)14
In the environment of threats and repressions for political actions, activists posit a demand 
for care and accountability as a defi ning feature of a leader: “We should have a leader who is 
more attentive and responsible for the people he15 asks for support from. A leader should talk 
with people, especially those who sacrifi ce themselves, who work for him and are not afraid. 
A political leader is not on his own” (interview with Zina, an activist, 10 November 15). Th is 
quote, as well as other similar refl ections, is important because, in contrast with the distancing 
accounts earlier, it places professional protesters back into the protest community and clarifi es 
what is seen to be the ideal relation between the activists and the professional protesters.
Compared to the generalizing and judgmental statements about politics as a set of dishonest 
activities and politicians as untrustworthy people typical to the discourse of depoliticization 
among activists and volunteers (see, e.g., Bennett et al. 2013; Eliasoph 1998), the informants 
quoted above present facts and have concrete indicators and details that explain their vision 
of the role of politicians. Furthermore, activists see their eff orts as benefi tting and needed for 
someone else—the leaders. Alienation that activists feel from their actions points to the process 
of political dispossession accompanying the professionalization of protests.
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Professional Protesters Envisioning Protests
Internal divisions and power confl icts undermine performance of political leadership. When 
I started my ethnographic research, Statkevich, who had just been released from his fi ve-year 
imprisonment that he had served without requesting pardon from Lukashenka, diff erently from 
other politicians, had the highest symbolic capital. As my informant Ian put it: “Statkevich is 
among the few politicians who deserves respect, because he was in prison for fi ve years. Five 
years! . . . And he was not afraid, he didn’t ask for clemency. He came out as a hero” (interview, 
15 October 2015). At fi rst, other opposition leaders also showed a will to cooperate with Statkev-
ich and during the protests in the autumn of 2015 they were standing side by side. But already 
in February 2016, signs of a new division became visible. Political leaders organized a series of 
separate protests dedicated to the same cause—the introduction of the “social parasites” tax; 
furthermore, the center-right coalition16 explicitly refused to join the Belarusian national con-
gress initiated by Statkevich as an attempt to unite diff erent opposition structures. Th ese events 
have only confi rmed the perception of the opposition politics as troubled.
Importantly, professional protesters themselves also shared a critical perception of their cir-
cle and the opposition politics in Belarus. Th e examples they provided: conversations and dis-
cussions with their colleagues they recalled have the undertone of useless struggles, tiredness, 
and disappointment that is very similar to what I found in activists’ narratives.17 Refl ecting on 
their own positionality, politicians juxtaposed politics and the work suitable for civil society. 
Th is discursive frame became especially salient in discussions of celebrating the BPR’s centen-
nial on 25 March 2018. Th is occasion was employed to diff erentiate the professional protesters 
and political structures calling for a protest march on the main Minsk avenue from those who 
agreed with the proposal of the city administration to celebrate the anniversary only with a 
concert, which would have been an offi  cially permitted event,18 as opposed to the protest march.
Advocates presented a protest march on 25 March as a political action that all real politicians 
should insist on and participate in. A concert without a march was, on the other hand, seen 
as a betrayal of the real cause the opposition was expected to support, and the professional 
protesters promoting it were derogatively referred as “the concert opposition.” In his announce-
ment “Political opposition has no right for Helsinki [sic] syndrome” published on Facebook and 
Vkontakte, Mikalai Statkevich, one of the most active proponents of street actions, frames this 
division among the Belarusian protest communities as follows:
Today, many people confuse the political opposition with non-political civil organizations 
and initiatives . . . What is normal and enough for the latter is absolutely not enough and 
sometimes not normal for the former. Transformation of the political opposition into the 
civil sector, preoccupation with small deeds, and the search of the leaders for approval from 
third-rank offi  cials are morally corrupt and dangerous [activities] for the health of the whole 
nation . . . Apart from the concert we insist on the dignifi ed march . . . which will be free from 
censorship of slogans and of expressions of people’s grievances and pain. (Facebook post, 3 
March 2018)
Several moments in this quote are worth noting with respect to positionality of democratic 
politicians in the Belarusian protest community. Th e text raises the issue of what might be con-
sidered a political action constitutive of political agency. One of the recurrent arguments for 
the march was that it is a traditional form of celebrating Dzen’ Voli in Belarus. Providing the 
repressive state power and the fact that it does not recognize the BPR as its predecessor, limiting 
celebration to only the concert was seen by some opposition leaders as depoliticizing the event. 
Th e proponents of the concert insisted on pragmatic gain from the safety provided by the offi  cial 
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permission of the event to attract more people and through that spread the alternative political 
message. Th erefore, while Statkevich’s supporters perceive public protests as the only proper 
form of political contention, their opponents suggest using the limited opportunities for their 
purpose.
Two moments are instructive in the division between these two groups: their relation to 
the state bodies and the way they defi ne what is political. Th e confl ict between protest politi-
cians and politicians who, as Statkevich believes, confuse themselves with civil society, plays 
out around interactions with representatives of the state power. Th e protest-oriented politicians 
claim the position of the opposition leader to be about continuous enactment of confl ict that 
excludes negotiations and agreements with state offi  cials. Furthermore, the discussions around 
celebration of Dzen’ Voli reveal an attempt to enlarge the spectrum of political expressions of 
dissent that will not lead to the persecution of the participants.
What the concert organizers attempted to achieve can be analyzed from the perspective 
developed by James Scott (1985, 1990), and seen as acts of hidden resistance. Scott insists that 
concealed ways of managing power disbalance should not be dismissed from the analysis of 
political resistance for being incidental, self-interested, and ideologically immature. Th e case of 
the BPR’s centennial celebration shows also how some protest professionals reject the political 
signifi cance of everyday activism and small deeds. Partially, it can be explained by the fact that 
hidden resistance requires recognition of one’s position as weak and vulnerable: this is not the 
status that protest professionals aspire to.
Paval Seviarynets, one of the leaders of Belarusian Christian Democrats, whose biggest con-
cern at that time was to keep the political community united, later characterized this confl ict in 
oppositional politics as a division between “heroic losers” and “respectable traitors” (fi eld notes, 
30 May 2018). Th is defi nition highlights an important aspect of the construction of political 
leaders in Belarus that resonates with activists’ perception of the democratic politics discussed 
in the previous section. Neither of the options presented by Seviarynets is attractive for protest 
actors to engage with. Repeated requests for heroic actions are exhausting human resources on 
the opposition side as people become aff ected by repressions, while negotiations with govern-
mental bodies that the activists distrust feed suspicions of moral corruption of the opposition 
politicians.19
International Structure of Democracy Promotion as Seen from Belarus
One of the factors defi ning professional subjectivities is that activities associated with or related 
to protest actions are performed as part of the formal occupation and involve a fi nancial com-
ponent. At the same time, as Cathy Shutt (2012) argues, interactions and interpretations that 
arise around the issue of fi nancial aid are never straightforward and unproblematic. Similarly, 
while being an accepted part of professional activities in the case of protests, fi nancial support 
to political opposition provokes ambivalent reactions. For some of my informants, remunera-
tion functions as a dividing line between selfl ess service in the name of big ideas and pragmatic 
interests polluting these ideas and activities.
Th e fi nancial support is discursively entangled with, fi rst, trust of a group or a person and, 
second, the protest subjects’ freedom of actions. Money is perceived as jeopardizing truthfully 
held values and principles guiding protester’s actions and making them dependent on a donor. 
One of the fi rst splits in the history of the Belarusian political opposition was connected to the 
radical rejection of the involvement of Western donors in the national struggles. In many of his 
publications, Zianon Pazniak, a founder of the Belarusian Popular Front and the leader of the 
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Conservative Christian Party of the Belarusian Popular Front, an oppositional leader himself, 
calls other Belarusian politicians receiving international fi nancial support “quasi-opposition,” 
“political businessmen” (palitbiznesmeny), and “political freeloaders” (palitkhaliaushchyki). Paz-
niak and his party members boycott all elections and do not cooperate on the party level with 
other opposition parties. Th e following quote by Pazniak (2016) is instructive of his vision of 
the issue:
Th e quasi-opposition does not have any ideas, except expecting a big freebie and adjusting to 
Western sponsors . . . All fuss around “a congress” [to decide on candidates and unify forces] 
and “unifi cation” of these political businessmen of “democracy” is connected, as always, to 
the possibility of receiving Western money for the election to the Parliament. Th e West has 
promised to give [money] if they unite (because it is easier to fi nance). For the political busi-
nessmen it does not matter what elections they get money for, even for one to hell, it is the 
money [that matters].
In this quote, the Belarusian politicians are represented as being driven only by fi nancial inter-
ests and as lacking political principles, ideas, and genuine values. It is worth noting that this 
discourse is also built on the assumption of the “West” being a homogenous political actor with 
suspicious intentions. In addition to popular distrust of the politics discussed earlier, here, a key 
fi gure for the Belarusian political opposition, Pazniak, links fi nancial support, moral doubt-
fulness, and the idea of dirty politics to construct the image of a Belarusian politician—a view 
that he repeats oft en, thus reproducing a division of the opposition structures along the lines of 
being a recipient of foreign aid.
At the same time, my interviews with activists, journalists, and civil right defenders belong-
ing to organizations castigated by Pazniak and his party provide evidence of awareness and 
criticism toward structures associated with the promotion of social and political changes. Some 
interlocutors were open about their concern with drawbacks on activism as a funded project. 
Referring to their experiences and observations, they maintain that the dominant format of 
project work subjugates the content and the ideas, as well as the expectations of donors, and that 
the pragmatism and a managerial perspective of applicants distort the priorities.
Another popular trope in these stories is that of “seminars in Vilnius,” symbolizing both what 
protest professionals do and the infrastructure created around the work for social and political 
changes in Belarus. Th e fact that the opposition meetings and training for Belarusian activists 
are mostly organized in neighboring Lithuania was initially motivated by safety concerns but 
currently has some ironic undertones. Several of my informants built their activist position in 
our conversations, explicitly articulating that they had never received any money or participated 
in trips and “seminars in Vilnius.” For these informants, “seminars in Vilnius” stands for a dubi-
ous performance of dissent present in the Belarusian protest fi eld that drains the budget but 
has no noticeable impact on the situation in Belarus. Sergei’s discussion about his experience 
of cooperation with a civil rights defenders organization illustrates the issue: “I helped writing 
an application for a long-term project with good money. Later, although I knew that the project 
was active, I was not able to see any relevant public activities [in Belarus], except that the people 
responsible for the project were in Vilnius and ate in restaurants that they openly shared in their 
profi les in social network” (interview, 7 September 2016).
To a certain extent, this refl ection might be seen in the framework of academic discussions on 
cooptation of work for social changes by the logic of business projects and infl uence of fi nancial 
capital and corporations on activist possibilities (Brown 2015; Dauvergne and LeBaron 2014). 
Th is scholarship argues that it is precisely the merging of activism and the neoliberal economic 
model that hinders real structural changes (Brown 2015). At the same time, while recognizing 
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issues with sustainability and the ability of what they call “the economy of grants” (interview 
with Pavel, 5 November 2015) to reproduce itself in the fi eld of Belarusian dissent, my infor-
mants tend to see the problem as arising from people’s greed and lack of political principles. As 
the activist Sergei concludes: “Th e opposition and the work with human rights are 90 to 95 per-
cent a sort of business. Th e majority of people are not interested in real changes in the country 
because they want to continue this European fi nancial fl ow” (interview, 7 September 2016). In 
a similar vein, Vital, another activist, wonders, “Why change anything if you are fed and have a 
good life? . . . Th ey [opposition politicians] have visas and trips to Copenhagen and Stockholm” 
(interview, 6 September 2016).
While emically, the focus of my informants is on the potentially corrupt and self-interested 
fi nancial activities of the protest professionals, analytically, it is revealing to recognize also how 
the neoliberal script of promoting democracy in nondemocratic countries interacts with the 
local actors. Drawing on the research on democracy inside protest communities (della Porta 
2015) and the problem of Europocentric universalism in the vision of democracy (Chabot and 
Vinthagen 2015), I suggest there are two intersecting lines of inequality. Th ese lines defi ne ten-
sions and controversies around fi nancial support in the enactment of a position of professional 
subject in the Belarusian protest fi eld. Th e fi rst disparity exists between activists and those pro-
fessionals who negotiate and distribute foreign aid for Belarusian struggles. Th is also includes 
access to visas, travels, daily allowances, and participation in seminars and meetings abroad, 
all of which contribute into the power position in the protest economy. Th e other dimension of 
inequality relates to positionality of local actors in the structure of international fi nancial assis-
tance. My informant Vadim, who was present at the meeting of representatives of Belarusian 
media in the parliament of one of the European states, uses the verb “begging” to describe the 
process (interview, 24 August 2016).
Alexei Pikulik and Sofi e Bedford add a dimension that complicates the issue of structural 
inequality even further. Scrutinizing democracy promotion in Belarus, the authors describe 
another infl uential group, the implementers, oft en confused with donors, but in fact an inter-
mediary between the donors and the recipients of aid. According to Pikulik and Bedford (2018: 
5), as the local civil society is usually perceived as immature, international organizations and 
NGOs are invited to assist the Western donors and manage fi nancial support. Th e implementers 
not only consume 50 to 70 percent of the allocated funds but also make the whole structure of 
democracy promotion rather inert and ineff ective. Motivated to secure the future cooperation 
with the donors, the implementers tend to choose and then stick to predictable and already 
known local partners that in turn precludes new local actors to be funded. Moreover, the imple-
menters prefer those projects that ensure smooth realization, therefore selecting what Pikulik 
and Bedford (2015) call “tame programs.” Th ese priorities shift  the focus away from the purpose 
of building democracy to the safety of implementers’ reputation. Analysis of democracy promo-
tion in Belarus presented by Pikulik and Bedford resonates with the criticism of transnational 
power asymmetries put forward in the decolonial refl ections on resistance (Chabot and Vin-
thagen 2015) and aid and development (Gardner and Lewis 2015).
“Western Money” in the Construction of Professional Subjectivities 
in Protests
While structural analysis of democracy promotion done by political scholars (Carothers 2009; 
Pikulik and Bedford 2018) is important, it gives a partial perspective without explaining how 
subjective choices and strategies animate this structure (Shutt 2012). I strive to rearticulate crit-
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icism that is sound in the data and turn it toward the eff ects of fi nancial assistance on the protest 
communities in Belarus. Indeed, the access to fi nancial aid has an ambivalent impact on activ-
ists and professionals. On the one hand, protest professionals and some activists frame the issue 
as one of basic needs and a prerequisite for work. Anna, a former activist and current civil rights 
defender, exemplifi es the point:
No revolution, no changes, and no infrastructure inside an organization can be done without 
money or a material base. Th e material base is important not because someone will line their 
own pockets, but we need infrastructure to give people basic things like a hot meal, transport, 
warm clothes and blankets, all that is connected to nonviolent resistance . . . People from 
small towns have lower salaries, if they work at all because of their activism. We need money 
simply to pay for their tickets [for travels to locations of seminars or other activities], to give 
them tea and coff ee so they won’t be hungry here. How to pay for this all? We need infrastruc-
ture. (Interview, 26 November 2015)
Contrary to the earlier examples in Anna’s quote, fi nancial aid is not presented as an attribute of 
professional subjectivities’ performances. Instead, it is directed as an act of care to activists and 
to the process of social and political changes.
On the other hand, my interviews speak of diff erent problems associated with practices of 
the usage of fi nancial aid, from the distortion of democratic decision-making inside protest 
communities, or the issue of resource distribution, to the acts of buying loyalty of activists and 
parties. Possession of fi nancial resources literally functions as an ultimate criterion of defi ning 
those whose voice is heard. Ales, an activist, explains how the decision to boycott the 2015 pres-
idential election, which he himself disapproved, was taken:
Ales: “All ours involved in the presidential campaign gathered and we had many cool ideas to 
off er, but Warsaw decided on boycott. Th at was it.”
A.M.: “Why Warsaw?”
Ales: “[One of the exiled Belarusian politicians] decided. How do we fi nd [a gesture signify-
ing the money]? We don’t have anything” (interview, 14 October 2015).
Th is story is important in respect to power relations among diff erent politicians and political 
structures. In the situation described here, the leader who had the money decided to support a 
particular campaign20—boycott—disregarding other suggestions and leaving others no option 
but to follow that decision. Th erefore, under the surface of what may look like a consensus of 
the opposition leaders hides internal dynamics of money as power, and one person’s decision 
becomes the unifi ed political strategy of the Belarusian opposition.
Another troubling example of the exercise of power through money was presented in diff er-
ent interviews in relation to engaging experienced activists and establishing new organizations. 
Th is practice is worrisome for my informants: the number of activists is limited, and if they are 
fi nancially tempted to join another initiative or organization, this has detrimental eff ects for the 
existing structures:
A part of activists was literally bought [before the 2010 election]. [An organization] had a lot 
of money. Many people had been working for free for many years before, and it was under-
standable that aft er some time they wanted something for themselves. (Interview with Ana-
tol, 16 October 15)
[An organization] in the 2010 presidential election was a force of evil. Th ey destroyed a lot 
of what had been built, they bought activists with money, they did not recruit new activists, 
they paid more to those who were already [members of] the existing parties and movements. 
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Th ey totally deformed the oppositional space and simply spoilt many people because they 
gave money without proper documentation. (Interview with Palina, 3 November 2015)
[An opposition leader] came to a small town, for example, Orsha, where they met Vasil, an 
activist of another party, and told him: “What about you become our member tomorrow and 
we would pay you monthly. Deal? At the moment, you have nothing, but with us, you will be 
paid.” Th e activist thought for a while and agreed. Th e same happened in other towns. Actu-
ally, already during the presidential election of 2006 these kinds of things happened, even if 
to a lesser extent, but anyway. A presidential candidate took the money and bought the party 
that was previously led by another politician. (Interview with Yauhen, 17 November 2015)
As the fi rst and last quotes demonstrate, in these narratives, the pragmatic choice of activists is 
presented as mostly justifi ed, and the discourse about them is rather apologetic. On the other 
hand, how the politicians aiming for national leadership use the money is discussed in very 
negative terms—as destroying the community and as a manifestation of evil (the second quote). 
Th is feeds disappointment and sometimes provokes disengagement from the movement and 
cynicism toward opposition politics (the last quote).
Th us, protest economy created by protest professionals fi lls the Belarusian opposition com-
munities with suspicions and accusations, and defi nes an area of vulnerability in politicians’ 
positionality. Being included in the international structure of democracy promotion and there-
fore sharing some eff ects of transnational inequalities with other countries deemed nondem-
ocratic, the Belarusian leaders and other actors controlling resources translate the neoliberal 
script in the work on political changes further to their communities. Th is reiterates the alien-
ation of activists and undermines the ability to protest.
Conclusion
Subjectivity of professional protesters as it is defi ned in this article from the perspective of per-
formativity has multiple dimensions. It is constructed in relation to other protest subjects, espe-
cially those enacting an activist position. Professional protesters perform a higher status that 
is confi rmed by being recognized by others. Furthermore, their position is built on participa-
tion in the protest economy that simultaneously empowers and subjugates professional protest-
ers. Access to resources available to professional protesters can support the work for common 
cause, but it also allows for application of unequal power inside Belarusian protest communities. 
Moreover, if the structure of fi nancial support is taken into account, the position of “Western 
donors” brings in another dimension in this hierarchy of protest economy.
Th e context that sets the background for Belarusian professional protesters’ actions is com-
plex. First, it concerns small and divided opposition communities in Belarus that cannot actu-
ally deliver the promised changes to their activists and supporters. Second, it creates general 
distrust toward politics as “a dirty business,” a phenomenon known as depoliticization, charac-
teristic in contemporary societies more generally. Finally, it refers to the international system of 
democracy promotion that infl uences what is supported in the fi ght for a new political future in 
Belarus and other local contexts.
My analysis highlights several tensions instructive of the position of Belarusian professional 
protesters. To begin with, a narrow understanding of the political as expressed in high-risk 
activities of unauthorized marches reinforces divisions in the oppositional communities and 
triggers confl icted feelings among activists. Furthermore, although Belarusian politicians tend 
to cling to their post in the parties, on the national scale, ambitions to and performances of lead-
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ership by politicians are rather short-lived. Th e position of “a national leader” is abandoned aft er 
every presidential electoral cycle, which only feeds cynicism and suspicions among activists 
and the broader public. In the interviews, the activists repeatedly challenge leaders’ ambitions 
that are seen to be based on pure performances of power, for example, keeping one’s position 
in a party and using big words such as democracy, Belarusianness, and the people. Instead, the 
activists emphasize codependence of activists and politicians. In reality, professionalization of 
protest alienates activists from their struggle that they become to perceive as the work benefi t-
ting predominantly protest professionals.
Th is article followed Butler’s (2015) call for attention to exclusions and power asymmetries 
created in the performative appearance of the “we” of the protesters. Moreover, informed by 
decolonial perspective on resistance presented in the work by Chabot and Vinthagen (2015), I 
extended this criticism to the international system of democracy promotion that adds another 
dimension to the hierarchy and in fact is unable to challenge the nondemocratic power (e.g., 
Pikulik and Bedford 2018). Instead, the project approach to social changes and professionaliza-
tion of resistance, as the scholarship on neoliberal transformation of social movements indicates 
(Brown 2015; Roy 2016), create external accountability, dispossess protesters of political power, 
and lead to maintaining the status quo.
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  NOTES
 1. Statkevich was accused of organizing a mass riot on the day of the presidential election, 19 December 
2010, and sentenced to six years’ imprisonment under Article 291.3 of the Criminal Code.
 2. Th e only exception to the suppressed political life in 2010–2015 is a series of silent protests triggered 
by the abrupt economic crisis in the spring 2011. Th e social and political base of silent protests is that 
although political activists did participate, most participants were mobilized via social networks and 
explicitly refused any association with existing oppositional structures.
 3. I use the plural form of “community” to emphasize the internal divisions, multiplicities of visions, and 
confl ictual understanding of preferable forms and means of actions within the Belarusian opposition.
 4. Not accidentally, some of the independent media and human rights organizations refer in their 
names to this particular time period: for instance, charter97.org (an independent media-resource) 
and spring96.org (a website of human rights organization Viasna that was originally called Viasna 96).
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 5. Th ree referendums initiated by Lukashenka in 1995, 1996, and 2004 signifi cantly expanded the power 
of the president at the expenses of free and independent courts and the parliament, but their results 
were not recognized by international communities and local observers because of numerous cases 
of fraud and manipulations in voting process. Consequently, the strong executive power managed to 
push the opposition out from all state governing bodies (Frear 2018; Silitski 2015).
 6. Th e discovery of Kuropaty—a place of mass execution and a burial site of the victims of Stalinist 
repressions on the outskirts of Minsk—by the historian and political leader Zianon Pazniak in 1988 
had the biggest infl uence on development of the oppositional movement. Later, more places were 
found in Minsk and other Belarusian towns. Th ose discoveries fed anti-Soviet sentiment and are still 
evoked by the national opposition against Lukashenka’s politics of integration with Russia and Rus-
sian politics in relation to Belarus that is seen as a continuation of the Soviet politics.
 7. In the observed period, fi nes were the most frequent offi  cial sanctions (e.g., for participation in an 
unauthorized mass event) against the protesters.
 8. In many cases, activists were informed about their administrative case post factum, as the police 
present noted their presence at the unauthorized event and proceeded with the case later. As a result, 
only the known activists could be targeted.
 9. Statkevich was the only former presidential candidate who never signed request for pardon to 
Lukashenka during his imprisonment. Th ose who signed such appeal were released within months 
of their imprisonment. As many of my informants pointed out, they particularly respected Statkevich 
for his persistence and readiness to serve full sentence.
 10. Th e BPR was declared in times of the German occupation of the Belarusian territory during World 
War I and existed until 1919, when the Red Army came to establish the Belarusian Soviet republic 
(BSSR). As the fi rst attempt to announce the Belarusian state, the establishment of the BPR is a key 
historical event for the national opposition. But it is barely emphasized in the offi  cial historiography 
and current state discourse that build the Belarusian statehood on the legacy of the BSSR.
 11. Th e missed opportunities to sustain protest (e.g., by organizing a protest camp on the day of election) 
were one of the recurrent regrets in the interviews. Both Hancharyk and Milinkevich suggested that 
people would go home, and ended the action on election day. In 2006, there was a tent camp orga-
nized by young activists who did not fall the opposition leaders’ call to stop the protests.
 12. Th is information was revealed later by Lukashenka and was presented as his gesture of support 
to democracy and competition. Importantly, this was admitted by the candidates themselves. It is 
recalled in other interviews as the moment of informants’ disillusionment (one even quit the party 
for this reason).
 13. Th e informant forgets to include Statkevich as a candidate who has stayed in politics aft er 2010.
 14. Interestingly, in April 2018, the youth organization of United Civic Party made a public announce-
ment that called for an introduction of a limit to the number of terms that one person can serve as 
the head of the party.
 15. Th e informant uses the pronoun “he” to signify an imaginative leader.
 16. Th e coalition was formed in 2015 and consists of the United Civic Party, the Belarusian Christian 
Party, and the Movement for Freedom.
 17. For ethical reasons, as some of the stories were told on the condition of not being recorded, I do not 
give specifi c examples of confl icts that my informants provided.
 18. To obtain offi  cial registration of any public event is important so that its participants are not prose-
cuted based on Article 23.34 of Administrative code of Republic of Belarus (participation in unau-
thorized mass events)
 19. One of the fi gures that might be seen as a symbol of this kind of suspicions and distrust in the oppo-
sition circles is an agent—a person who pretends to share the oppositional views but in reality coop-
erates with the KGB (Committee for State Security—its name and function are the same as during the 
Soviet time). Although there were many stories on KGB agents, several of my informants acknowl-
edged that preoccupation with exposure of agents is problematic in itself, creating an atmosphere of 
suspicions.
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 20. Any political campaign needs fi nancial resources that are used, for example, for printing leafl ets, 
stickers, etc.
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